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Abstract : This research explores the impact of gender representation at the
state and local levels on redistributive choices. This research also examines whether
female ofﬁceholders moderate the impact of the local economy and institution on
welfare spending. Hypotheses are tested across 58 counties in California over ten
years, between 2001 and 2010. According to the ﬁxed effect models, women in
state legislature had a positive effect on local welfare spending, while women on
county boards had no signiﬁcant effect. However, a positive moderating effect of
women on county boards during economic hardship was found. Three categories
of control variables include institutional factors, such as the introduction of
Proposition 1A and county home rule; political factors, such as the political
preference of each county’s residents and strength of non-proﬁt organisations;
and socio-economic factors, such as intergovernmental revenue, unemployment
rate and demographics. Counties with more intergovernmental revenue and
supporters of Democratic presidential candidates are likely to spend more on
welfare services.
Key words: California, economy, gender representation, intergovernmental
revenue, political ideology, social welfare
Introduction
Recurring ﬁnancial crises in American local governments bring attention to
the priority issues in ﬁnancial resource allocation. The choices of local
governments to spend their money among different policy areas are
inﬂuenced by various factors. The importance and proportion of local
welfare spending has been increasing over the past few decades (e.g. Witco
and Newmark 2009). Redistributive services, such as welfare, health and
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public safety, are traditionally provided by counties as political subdivisions of
state governments (Schneider and Park 1989; Berman 1993; Choi et al.
2010; Farmer 2011). Most of these redistributive services are mandated and
take up a large share of county spending (Schneider and Park 1989;
Park 1996). Among the spending categories of California counties, public
protection and public assistance take up more than 25 per cent of total county
expenditures.
This paper examines factors that affect a county’s preferences on welfare
spending in California, focusing on the gender representation of county
boards of supervisors and the state legislature. Social welfare is viewed as a
gendered policy domain, as it is particularly related to the interests of
minorities including women (Riccucci and Meyers 2004; Wilkins and
Keiser 2006). Despite a relatively large proportion of women at the local
level, the role of female local ofﬁcials and its impact on the politics
of ﬁnancial choices is largely underexplored (Garber and Turner 1995;
MacManus 1996; Fox and Schuhmann 2000; Alozie and McNamara
2010). We seek to explore this and also attempt to test whether women
ofﬁceholders moderate the impact of the local economy and institutions on
welfare spending, because social welfare is not only related to gender, but is
also politically vulnerable during an economic recession.
California counties constitute an excellent testing ground for the impact
of various factors including gender representation on welfare spending.
First, local governments in California have been through notable institu-
tional changes under continuing ﬁscal constraints and the growing service
demands of an ever-increasing population in the state. Notably, California
recently suffered from a bubble-burst caused by the stock market decline in
early 2000 (Musso et al. 2006). In response, Governor Schwarzenegger
proposed several solutions, including signiﬁcant expenditure cuts for schools,
health and human services, local assistance and state employee compensation
(Spilberg and Alexander 2003).1
Second, based on its 1879 constitution, California has historically given
wide autonomy to local governments in structural, programmatic and ﬁscal
areas (Sokolow and Detwiler 2001, 59). In 1911, “California was the ﬁrst
state to amend its constitution to permit home rule for counties” (Menzel
1996, 5). Local governments with home rule charter usually have discre-
tionary power in choosing the forms of government, functions and services
they provide and in dealing with managerial and ﬁscal issues. Although
Proposition 13 in 1978 has limited local autonomy, several counteractive
institutional measures have been taken since then.
1
“Schwarzenegger’s Solution to California’s Budget Woes: End Welfare” By Agence France-
Presse, Saturday, 15 May 2010.
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Third, there exists a considerable difference in ﬁscal, political and
administrative capacities among counties (Berman 1993). In particular,
California counties are large and diverse enough to examine redistributive
efforts within counties in relation to institutional, political and economic
factors. For example, Alpine County has the smallest county population at
little more than 1,000 persons, while Los Angeles County has a population
of nearly ten million, which is more than some states in the United States
have in total, including Georgia, Indiana, Washington and Massachusetts.
In addition, there are signiﬁcant variations in welfare spending across
counties. In terms of the size of the total welfare budget in 2010, Los
Angeles County spends more than 5,000 times what Alpine County does.
One of the prominent issues in county research is how leadership affects
policy choices at the county level (Menzel 1996; Svara 1996; Benton 2005).
A substantial amount of evidence has been collected in the public man-
agement scholarship on the effect of the quality of leaders/CEOs/managers
on organisational outcomes or results (e.g. Meier and O’Toole 2002).
MacManus (1996) offers a comprehensive description of governing boards,
including the form, name, size, partisanship and term of ofﬁce. Avellandeda
(2009) reveals that mayoral qualities, such as educational background and
job-related expertise, have been associated with local public ﬁnance in
40 Colombian municipalities over the ﬁve years between 2000 and 2004.
This research also shows that the positive inﬂuence of mayoral qualities on
property tax collection and social spending per capita is moderated by
external constraints (Avellandeda 2009).
Among various leadership qualities, we focus on gender representation in
county and state leadership positions as an important factor in the politics
of redistribution at the local level.2 To address this link in the context of
local government expenditures, we ﬁrst use models to capture any differ-
ences that the gender variable may have caused in spending decisions on
welfare. Subsequently, we take into account the economic and institutional
factors that might affect the degree of inﬂuence of the gender variable. By
including interaction terms in the model, this paper explores the mediating
effect of the county leadership role in times of economic hardship and in
counties with home rule. We test conditional hypotheses that the effect of
female supervisors on county boards depends on the economic situation,
measured by the unemployment rate at the county level every year, and the
2 The term “local government” is often used as a generic term for governments below the state
level, including counties, cities and special districts. In this paper, county governments are often
referred to as local governments. When including cities, this paper uses the term “city or muni-
cipal governments”, as municipal governments include cities, towns and townships while
excluding counties.
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institutional situation, measured by the charter status of counties as a time-
invariant factor.
Counties under ﬁscal stress
The service role of county governments has been signiﬁcantly expanded in
recent years (Benton 2002a; Streib et al. 2007). Since the state-local realign-
ment proposals in 1991 and 1994–1995, counties have had more ﬂexibility
and ﬁscal incentives to determine budget decisions based on local needs.3With
little difference from municipal governments, county governments practically
function as a general-purpose government (Benton 2002a). In particular,
California counties become a primary general government to the residents in
regions that are not incorporated to cities. Despite the public support and
recognition of counties as “full-service governments” (Menzel 1996; Benton
2002a, 196), however, scholars have devoted relatively little attention to
county governments.4
Counties are required to play several roles in the state-local relationship.
On the one hand, they operate as the administrative arm of the state
government within federalism, and on the other, they serve as the direct
providers of services that meet the needs of their residents (Ostrom and
Ostrom 1988; Berman 1993; Berman and Salant 1996; Benton 2002a;
Chapman 2003; Choi et al. 2010). As an important coordinating unit in the
state-local relationship, counties with large jurisdictions take on compli-
cated issues, such as environment, transportation and other urban services
(Benton 2002b, 475).
Counties have a considerable amount of ﬂexibility in applying mandates
(Morgan andKickham 1999; Sokolow andDetwiler 2001; Streib et al. 2007).
In particular, urban counties have more options in choosing the speciﬁc range
of services and programmes they provide (Morgan and Kickham 1999).
Oakerson and Parks (1989, 290) admit that counties are a legal and political
subdivision of state government, but the conception of “creature of the state”
is “both empirically incorrect and normatively misleading”. Under ﬁscal
federalism, there is a division of economic responsibilities between the federal,
state and local governments (Stiglitz 2000, 728).
Although the division of responsibilities between state and local gov-
ernment is complicated, providing redistributive services has been one of
the most important responsibilities of counties.
3 The Realignment Proposal in 1991 transferred welfare programmes in the areas of mental
health, social services and health from the state to the counties (Cohen 2001).
4 With the tradition of a long-standing state-centred view, counties have often been described
as “forgotten governments”, “dark continents”, “the jungle of the American political scene” or
“ramshackle” (see Schneider and Park 1989; Menzel 1996).
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For example, California’s child welfare service programmes are provided
by the Department of Social Services in the state government and by county
agencies, including county welfare departments and county social service
departments.5 Current state law requires all counties to establish specialised
organisational entities within county welfare departments that have sole
responsibility for the operation of the child welfare services programmes
(California Department of Finance 1997, 1). The state has discretion to
determine the services to be provided and the eligibility criteria for receipt of
services; however, counties have greater discretion in the structuring of
programmes and the allocation of resources under the state’s block-grant
funding (California Department of Finance 1997).6 The State Department
does not have enough information and the counties have different criteria
for determining cases in the programme. In a study of the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families programme, Riccucci and Meyers (2004)
also posits that programme goals vary across counties even though policy
goals are centralised at the state level. Thus, the success of local welfare
services depends on whether the state obtains commitments from the
county agencies.
Accordingly, counties, as a local service provider and the ﬁrst contact
with clients, have fairly high levels of discretion in implementing the service
delivery systems in which the funds are spent (Pagano 1997; Dougherty
et al. 2003; Krane et al. 2004). In other words, the local budget decisions on
welfare will pretty much depend on the preferences of county ofﬁcials
in welfare service agencies. In particular, county ofﬁcials on the boards
exercise the executive, legislative and quasi-judicial authority of the county.
In partnership with county staff, county supervisors are deeply involved in
the delivery of services and programmes to the county region. They set
priorities on budgets, supervise county ofﬁcials and spend money on pro-
grammes aimed to meet the needs of county residents (California State Asso-
ciation of Counties 2009).
5 Child Welfare Services (CWS) is the programme umbrella that encompasses most of the
programmes that provide services for abused children and their families with the goal of main-
taining or returning children to their homes. Four principal programme components are emer-
gency response, family maintenance, family reuniﬁcation and permanent placement. Funding for
the CWS programme is from a combination of federal, State General Fund and county funding
sources. The non-federal share of costs are split between the state (70 per cent) and counties (30
per cent).
6 According to the report from the California Department of Finance 1997, xii), “… the State
theoretically has primary responsibility for welfare programs such as Child Welfare Services,
Foster Care, and Adoptions. However, this creates the illusion of a uniform statewide program
design and administration. In fact, even though program policies for these programs are pro-
mulgated at the State level, there is little consistency among counties in the way those policies are
implemented. In effect, the State has 58 different child welfare systems”.
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With decreasing revenue from other levels of government and increasing
demand for urban services, counties are under ﬁscal pressure to balance
their budgets (Pagano 1997; Dougherty et al. 2003). Local ofﬁcials in
counties must therefore choose which services they will provide and ﬁnd
more efﬁcient and effective ways to provide these services (Cigler 1994;
Benton 2002a, 204).7 County governments have the ﬂexibility to create or
distribute surplus funds by changing expenditure categories (Pagano 1997;
Morgan and Kickham 1999; Dougherty et al. 2003) and to resist unfunded
state mandates (Berman and Salant 1996). Several studies suggest that
state governments under ﬁscal pressure allow more discretion, transfer
state and federal responsibilities, and impose unfunded mandates on local
governments (Berman 1993; Krane et al. 2004; Sosin et al. 2010). Since
October 2011, the California state government has expanded mandates,
including those related to Child Welfare Services, Adult Protective Services,
mental health, and drug and alcohol programmes to counties (Danielson
and Mejia 2011).
Hypotheses
Gender and welfare politics
This study aims to test whether female ofﬁceholders at the state and local
levels make a difference in local welfare expenditures. Women are playing
an increasingly important role in local politics (Fox and Schuhmann 2000;
Alozie and McNamara 2010). Compared to the studies of women in state
legislatures and Congress, however, few works exist that attempt to analyse
the impact of women in local ofﬁce (MacManus and Bullock 1995).
The concept of representativeness or diversity has received more atten-
tion since traditional representative institutions like legislatures have been
challenged in dealing with complex issues in communities.8 The literature
on representative bureaucracy offers a theoretical framework for this
research. It assumes that the presence or increased presence of minorities in
bureaucracy will have a substantive effect on policy choices or outputs.
Minority bureaucrats can produce substantive beneﬁts for their social
groups directly through their own administrative behaviour and indirectly
by inﬂuencing others’ behaviours (Lim 2006).9
7 “Unpaid State Bills Shift Burden to Local Governments”, by Daniel C. Vock, 21 October
2010, Stateline, the Daily News Service of the Pew Center on the States.
8 However, scholars warn against potential threats to the democratic principles and a ﬂawed
conceptual foundation (Thompson 1976; Lim 2006).
9 There are direct sources of substantive effects, such as bureaucratic partiality, shared value
and beliefs and empathic understanding, as well as indirect sources, such as colleague pressures,
demand inducement and coproduction inducement (Lim 2006).
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The evidence on gender difference in policy preference is quite strong.
Women have a more distinctive focus on “women’s issues” as policy prio-
rities, including policies that impact women, children, family, welfare and
health, while focusing less on other issues, such as economic development
(Burns and Schumaker 1987; Schumaker and Burns 1988; Saint-Germain
1989; Thomas 1991; Carroll 1994, 2003; Schlesinger and Heldman 2001;
Dolan 2002; Keiser et al. 2002; Stivers 2002; Swers 2002; Wilkins 2006;
Wilkins and Keiser 2006; Alozie and McNamara 2010). Several scholars
argue that the gender gap is distinctive enough that it cannot be erased by
organisational socialisation (Dolan 2002) and will make a substantial con-
tribution rather than a symbolic one (Carroll 2003; Lim 2006; Park 2013).
An interesting question here is whether the difference in attitudes
and priorities between men and women makes a real difference in policy
outcomes (Dolan 2002; Andrews et al. 2005; Wilkins and Keiser 2006;
Bradbury and Kellough 2007; Jacobson et al. 2010; Park 2013). Women
and minorities in high-level positions are more likely to push for social
welfare programmes (Keiser et al. 2002; Riccucci and Meyers 2004;
Wilkins 2006; Bradbury and Kellough 2007), which might link demo-
graphic or passive representation to substantive or active representation in
speciﬁc areas (Dolan 2002; Keiser et al. 2002; Riccucci and Meyers 2004;
Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006; Wilkins and Keiser 2006).10
Studies have found that women leaders and ofﬁceholders bring up dif-
ferent policy issues and solutions by exercising a different leadership style
from that of their male counterparts (Fox and Schuhmann 2000; Carroll
2003; Mandell and Pherwani 2003). For example, Selden (1997, 69)
explained the variations in housing loan approval decisions by county
supervisors with the concept of the “minority representative role”. She
argues that the mediating effect of the minority representative role is more
important than minority status itself. Furthermore, empirical research has
identiﬁed the group-beneﬁtting behaviour of women in legislative bodies
(Saint-Germain 1989; Thomas 1991; Carroll 1994; Bratton and Haynie
1999; Saidel and Loscocco 2005). Women legislators are more likely to
initiate bills on issues associated with women’s concerns. The legislative
agendas of female state legislators display different policy priorities and pur-
sue distinctive legislative politics as compared to male legislators.
Given the gendered characteristics of the welfare policy area, policy
consequences are expected from an increased number of females repre-
sented in local governments and state legislature. We include gender
10 Active representation occurs when behaviours of minority decision makers are consistent
with the beneﬁts of the minority group. There is still no consensus on whether passive repre-
sentation leads to this “minority-beneﬁting administrative behavior” (Lim 2006, 198).
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representation in the state legislature because of the dynamics of
California’s budget process and the state inﬂuence on local budget. We
expect that there will be a positive relationship between the percentage
of women ofﬁceholders in county boards and the state legislature and
the portion of the county budget spent on welfare. Further, we examine
whether or not the inﬂuence of gender representation on welfare spending
has a linear relationship.
(H1A): County welfare spending will be positively associated with an
increase in the number of women supervisors on county boards.
(H1B): County welfare spending will be positively associated with an increase
in the percentage of women in state legislature leadership positions.
According to literature on representative bureaucracy, the presence of
minorities, i.e. passive representation, does not guarantee policy choices for
minorities (Riccuci and Meyers 2004; Lim 2006; Bradbury and Kellough
2007); rather, active representation is needed. Active representation
occurs when some speciﬁc conditions are met, such as critical mass of
minority groups (Kanter 1977), policy discretion (Keiser et al. 2002) and
institutional context and policy areas (Wilkins and Keiser 2006). This line
of reasoning leads us to a detailed hypothesis that expects a moderating
effect on local welfare decisions when county leadership includes women
supervisors. We identify the economic and institutional conditions that
expand the degree of discretion of local governments. We expect that an
increase in the number of women ofﬁceholders has a substantive effect on
local welfare choices in counties under economic pressures and/or in
counties with home rule. Assuming that women ofﬁceholders may not
always have the same attitude in dealing with ﬁscal challenges, we expect
that there may be an interactive effect for the leadership and economy
variables. Women ofﬁceholders may play the role of minority representa-
tive when the economy worsens, since state governments may allow more
local discretion (Berman 1993; Krane et al. 2004; Sosin et al. 2010), and
when policy choices beneﬁtting women and minorities are at stake.
Considering the gendered nature of social welfare, we expect that women
ofﬁceholders will be more protective of welfare expenditures when they are
threatened by economic and ﬁscal crises. As the degree of administrative
discretion available to county boards is a key issue linking passive and
active representation in this study, we also expect that institutional condi-
tions increasing local discretion will positively moderate the effect of
women supervisors on local welfare spending.
Conditional hypotheses have been constructed, suggesting that the effect
of women supervisors on county boards may depend on economic and
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institutional factors. More speciﬁcally, an increase in welfare expenditures
is positively associated with an increase in the number of women on county
boards when the county economy goes bad and/or counties have home rule.
As we are interested in the effect of gender representation in county gov-
ernments, we specify the following hypotheses:
(H2A): During an economic downturn, county welfare spending will be
positively associated with an increase in the number of women supervisors
on county boards.
(H2B): In county governments with home rule, county welfare spending
will be positively associated with an increase in the number of women
supervisors on county boards.
Three categories of control variables are discussed below: institutional
factors, such as the introduction of Proposition 1A and chartered or
general-law counties; political factors, such as the support for the demo-
cratic presidential nominee of each county and the strength of interest
groups; and socio-economic factors, such as intergovernmental revenue,
unemployment rates, the percentage of females in the population, the per-
centage of the population over 65 and under 14, per capita personal income
and median income.
Institutional factors
County home rule. Several studies have presented evidence that the gov-
ernment structure associated with a home rule charter affects the spending
of county governments (Duncombe 1977; DeSantis and Renner 1994;
Benton 2002a, 2002b; Choi et al. 2010). Efforts to modernise city and
county governments are closely related to home rule, which involves greater
autonomy in structural, functional and ﬁscal areas (Benton 2002b, 473).
Often, cities and counties adopt charters because of structural reasons
rather than functional ones (Sokolow and Detwiler 2001, 61). However,
the effect of home rule seems more limited in counties than cities, because
counties are more dependent on state control compared to cities (Sokolow
and Detwiler 2001; Benton 2002b). Yet, we assume that charter status
affects counties in the same way it does cities (Benton 2002b, 474). Char-
tered counties are expected to respond to the needs of citizens more effec-
tively (Benton 2002b; Chapman 2003; Choi et al. 2010).11
Although we expect that an institutional condition that increases local
discretion will be associated with positive moderating effects on local
11 According to Benton (2002b, 474), “the granting of home rule charters makes it possible
for counties to become full-service governments”.
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welfare spending, the effect of county home rule on welfare spending may
be complex. On one hand, counties with home rule have an incentive to
focus more on services that match local needs. Average taxpayers in
counties may choose to expand redistributive policies for social responsibility
and long-term positive policy outcomes (Moane andWallerstein 2001; Farmer
2011).12 In this case, charter status may be positively associated with welfare
expenditures. However, counties are also tempted to focus on generating
revenuewith economic development rather than social welfare (Peterson 1981;
Benton 2002b; Choi et al. 2010; Farmer 2011). According to Peterson (1981),
localities have distinct preferences for developmental policy areas rather than
redistributive programmes, because they are afraid of losing residents and
sources of revenue (Bahl et al. 2002; Stein 2003; Farmer 2011).
Proposition 1A in 2004. The approval of Proposition 1A in 2004 is one
of the important institutional changes to affect local ﬁnance after
Proposition 13. Enacted in 1978, Proposition 13 forbade local ofﬁcials
from setting their own property tax rates in order to protect homeowners.
The direct effect of Proposition 13was a sharp drop in property taxes, whereas
the long-term effect of this measure was more complex than expected.13
Proposition 13 fundamentally undermined the ﬁscal and political indepen-
dence of local governments in California (Sokolow and Detwiler 2001, 63;
Chapman 2003; Danielson and Mejia 2011; Misczynski and Mejia 2011).
Correlatively, tensions between the state and local governments have been
growing since the proposition (Chapman 2003; Misczynski and Mejia 2011).
As a response of local authorities, there have been several attempts to
modify the state-local relationship and to limit the state’s ﬁscal interference
(Danielson and Mejia 2011; Misczynski and Mejia 2011). In November
2004, Proposition 1A was approved as a way to protect local government
budgets from being transferred to the state government and to prohibit
unfunded state mandates. As a consequence, local governments have more
ﬂexibility in managing local programmes, as this proposition limits state
control over local property tax and local sales tax.
Political factors
Political ideology: Democratic votes in presidential elections. As choices
for redistributive services are closely related to state and local politics, it is
essential to include political variables in the study of local ﬁnance. We
expect that the political/ideological attitudes of county residents inﬂuence
12 “Budget Cuts to Programs for Elderly May Cost Money Later”, Pamela M. Prah, 28 July
2011, Stateline, the Daily News Service of the Pew Center on the States.
13 Chapman (2003) investigates local government autonomy in terms of “initiative” and
“immunity” after the shock of Proposition 13 in 1978.
278 PARK
local spending decisions on welfare. The inﬂuence of the ideological
environment of the local community on bureaucratic output has been
elaborated in the Kaufman’s (1959) classic study. The political preferences of
the public are reﬂected in the choices of the people who have power, according
to pluralist theory (Stein 2003). Most elected county ofﬁcials are willing to
respond to local needs that reﬂect the political preference of county residents
(Park 1996). As such, it is necessary to control for political/ideological pre-
ference when examining the factors that result in different spending levels in
different policy areas (Park 1996; Fox and Schuhmann 2000).
It is widely acknowledged by scholars that Democrats are more
favourable to redistributive policies than Republicans, while Republicans
are more likely to increase spending on developmental policies (Fry and
Winters 1970; Keiser 1997; Mead 1999; Alt and Lowery 2000; Nicholson-
Crotty et al. 2006; Witco and Newmark 2009; Choi et al. 2010; Soss et al.
2011). Thus, we hypothesize that the more votes cast in a county for a
presidential nominee from the Democratic Party, the more the county will
spend on welfare. The political ideology of county residents is measured
by counting the Democratic vote share in general presidential elections
every four years.
Strength of interest groups: number of non-proﬁt organisations. We
consider interest groups as one of the political actors in local politics related
towelfare. Interest groups are known to have a negative effect on thewelfare of
lower income populations, because these populations are not represented by
interest groups (Schattschneider 1960; Fry and Winters 1970). Yet, under the
competition for funding, interest groups with professional expertise may
inﬂuence the behaviours of public ofﬁcials in various ways (Fry and Winters
1970; Chapman 2003). We expect that interest groups having common
interests in human services may contribute to increasing, or at least
maintaining, the level of welfare spending in local governments.
Socio-economic factors
Intergovernmental revenue: state and federal aid. Revenue from other
levels of government accounts for a substantial share of county revenue
(Duncombe 1977; Park 1996). Most of the social welfare programmes in
California, such as California Work Opportunity and Responsibility to
Kids and In-Home Supportive Services, are funded by the federal and state
levels of government. Several important programmes, such as welfare,
education and health, are supported by a mix of federal, state and local
funding (Misczynski and Mejia 2011). State and local government provide
different services with different funding sources, although there is no clear
division in programmes and funding among the levels of government.
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Considering the stimulative effect of funding (Courant et al. 1979; Benton
1992), we expect more local spending on the areas aided from the higher
levels of government. Therefore, it is necessary to control intergovernmental
transfers to identify factors affecting county spending on redistributive services
(Park 1996; Witco and Newmark 2009, 219).
Economic hardship: unemployment rate. The relationship between econ-
omy and local public ﬁnance is well established. Early political scientists seem
to agree that socio-economic variables account for local expenditures better
than political variables do (Fabricant 1952; Dye 1966; Sharkansky and
Hofferbert 1969). Since California counties have suffered from chronic eco-
nomic recessions, the potential effect of this economic variable will be con-
sidered in the redistributive expenditures in California counties.14 However,
the effect of economy on local welfare services can be equivocal (Watkins-
Hayes 2011). In times of economic hardship, local governments experience
both a decrease in the state budget and a counties’ own revenue sources
(Berman 1993; Berman and Salant 1996; California State Association of
Counties 2009) and an increase in local needs for welfare at the same time.
Demographics: the ratio of female population, population over 65, popu-
lation under 14, per capita personal income and median income. In
general, demographic characteristics reﬂect local demands for public ser-
vices. The composition of the population can be a strong determinant of
local choices on spending (Dye 1966;Witco and Newmark 2009). Counties
may increase or decrease spending on certain programmes according to
demands for the provision of the redistributive services (Benton 2002a).
California counties vary greatly in size, economy, geography and demo-
graphics, which leads them to have different demands on welfare. In the end,
we need to consider the characteristics of the communities in which the politics
of redistribution occur (Fry and Winters 1970; Fox and Schuhmann 2000).
County choices for redistributive services may depend on community
characteristics, such as population size and growth (Schneider and Park
1989; Park 1996; Choi et al. 2010; Farmer 2011), problem intensity (Fosset
and Thompson 2005) and racial diversity (Fosset and Thompson 2005;
Choi et al. 2010; Farmer 2011). We expect that there is a greater need for
redistributive services in counties with a higher percentage of minority
groups that may beneﬁt from welfare programmes. Women, children and
seniors are also included as target groups for services in California counties,
as these counties already have various social service programmes assisting
these groups. We also consider the wealth and income of county residents.
14 California has experienced dramatic ups and downs in its economic vitality during the past
few decades, referred to as the “California Roller Coaster” (Myers et al. 2012).
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Counties with wealthy residents may spend more on growth-oriented,
developmental services than redistributive, social services (Park 1996; Bahl
et al. 2002). The wealth and income of county residents are captured by the
per capita personal income and median income.
Data and Methods
Our hypotheses are tested with panel data across 58 counties in California
over ten years (2001–2010). Data are drawn from various sources, such as
the Counties Annual Report, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, RANDCalifornia
and the California Elections Data Archive (CEDA). Data and measures are
shown in Table 1.
This paper uses expenditure data to measure the decisions or choices of
county governments with regard to welfare services. The expenditure data
is useful for capturing the trends of county choices in funding redistributive
services (Benton 2002a). The dependent variable is the amount of county
expenditures on public assistance, including welfare, social services, general
relief and other public assistance programmes. Care of court wards and
veteran services are included in this category according to the ofﬁcial clas-
siﬁcation. We tested the variable total welfare spending of the model spe-
ciﬁcation for stationarity with the Levin-Lin-Chu test (time trend included)
and found evidence against the null hypothesis of a unit root. We therefore
concluded that total welfare spending is stationary. The changes in the total
welfare spending of counties with a representative shape over ten years are
presented in Figure 1. The trends show no consistent shape after inﬂation
adjustment – they are either increasing or decreasing, showing smooth
changes or changes with ﬂuctuations.
Our major independent variable is the gender representation in state and
local government. For the causal inference based on the temporal pre-
cedence condition, all the independent variables except a charter dummy
were lagged one year. Two measures of gender representation at different
levels of government are (1) the number of women on the board of super-
visors of each county and (2) the percentage of women ofﬁceholders in state
legislature leadership positions. Two conditional hypotheses are tested
using multiplicative interaction models (Brambor et al. 2006). The inter-
action variables were developed to further explore the county leadership
role in chartered counties and in times of ﬁscal stress and its impact on
policy choices related to welfare.
In counting the number of female supervisors-elect, we check the name of
the successful candidates in CEDA and identify the supervisor’s gender
through a name gender guesser (www.genderguesser.com) and through
search websites if the gender is not clear. California counties each have ﬁve
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Table 1. Data and measures
Variables Data Source
Dependent variable Total amount of public assistance
expenditures ($) (2000–2009)
RAND California County Finance Statistics and Counties Annual Report
http://www.ca.rand.org; http://www.sco.ca.gov
Gender representation in the county
level (L)
Number of women in the board of
supervisors (2001–2010)
California Elections Data Archive
http://www.csus.edu/calst/index.html
Gender representation in the state
level (L)
Percentage of women in legislative
leadership (2001–2010)
Center for American Women and Politics
http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu
Economic hardship (L) Unemployment rate (%) (2001–2010) Bureau of Labor Statistics
http://www.bls.gov
Intergovernmental aid (L) Intergovernmental revenue
(2001–2010)
RAND California County Finance Statistics and Counties Annual Report
http://www.ca.rand.org; http://www.sco.ca.gov
Political ideology (L) Democratic votes in Presidential
General Elections (%) (2001–2010)
California State Archives
http://www.sos.ca.gov
Strength of interest groups (L)(LN) Number of non-proﬁt organisations (ln)
(2001–2010)
National Center for Charitable Statistics
http://www.nccsdataweb.urban.org
County home rule Charter status (0, 1) California State Association of Counties
http://www.counties.org
Proposition 1A (L) Proposition 1A (0, 1: before = 0, after
2004 = 1)
Demographics (L) Percentage of females in total
population (2001–2010)
Bureau of Labor Statistics
http://www.bls.gov/cps/demographics.htm
Percentage of population of age over 65
(2001–2010)
Bureau of Labor Statistics
http://www.bls.gov/cps/demographics.htm
Percentage of population of age under
14 (2001–2010)
Bureau of Labor Statistics
http://www.bls.gov/cps/demographics.htm
Per capita income ($) (2001–2010) Bureau of Economic Analysis
http://www.bea.gov
Median income ($) (2001–2010) United States Census Bureau
http://www.census.gov/did/www/saipe/county.html
Note: All ﬁnancial data are adjusted for inﬂation based on statewide Consumer Price Indexes for urban consumers using 2011 dollars. The variables with (L) are
lagged one year.
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supervisors with four-year staggered terms on a non-partisan ballot (www.
guidetogov.org).15 Two supervisors are elected in one general election
and three supervisors in the next. The four-year staggered term of county
supervisors posed a challenge in counting the number of women supervisors-
elect in each county. To sort out the effect of incumbents, we used the number
of successful female candidates rather than the proportion of women in
county boards.
A state legislature is a legislative branch of the government that holds the
principal law-making powers of the state (www.legislature.ca.gov). Every
state has its own legislative body. As a measure of gender representation
at the state level, we have used the percentage of women in leadership
positions in the California state legislature from the Center for American
Women and Politics. It not only reﬂects the distribution and penetration of
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Figure 1 Changes of total welfare spending of nine counties with a representative
shape by year.
15 California counties are regulated by Government Code Section 25,000, which requires
each county to have a Board of Supervisors consisting of ﬁve members, except for San Francisco
City and County with 11 members and one mayor. Considering the non-partisan election of
county supervisors, we do not include the ideological alignment between the different levels of
government in our empirical model.
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women in higher leadership positions, but also shows more dynamic changes
than the percentage of women in the state legislature, which has increased
gradually and has now reached over 20 per cent (for more about themeasures
of representation, refer Greene et al. 2000). The leadership positions include
Senate President and President Pro Tempore, Majority andMinority Leaders,
Republican and Democratic Caucus Chairs, Secretary of the Senate, Speakers
of the State Assembly including Pro Tempore, Majority Floor Leader,
Assistant Majority Whip and Democratic Caucus Chairs, among others.
Intergovernmental revenue is drawn from the RAND California County
Finance Statistics and Counties Annual Report. Federal and state aid for
social assistance programmes and administration is included. The political/
ideological attitude of each county’s residents is measured by the propor-
tion of Democratic votes in the presidential general elections in 2000, 2004
and 2008 in the California State Archives (www.sos.ca.gov).
As a measure for the strength of interest groups, we include the number
of registered 501(c)(3) non-proﬁt organisations offering human services
in each county.16 Major categories include organisations offering child
daycare, in-home assistance, family care, family services for adolescent par-
ents, single-parent services, family-violence shelters, pregnancy centres and
emergency assistance, as well as speciﬁc organisations, such as senior centres,
developmental disability centres, women’s centres, ethnic and immigrant cen-
tres, homeless centres, blind and visually impaired centres, deaf and hearing-
impaired centres and LGBT centres. Demographic variables are from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics and United States Census Bureau.
Results and Discussion
Tables 2 and 3 provide descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations
among the variables.
To examine the robustness of the results shown in Tables 4 and 5, we
have re-estimated the analysis using sensitivity tests. In addition, a number
of diagnostics, including the variance inﬂation factor (VIF) test for multi-
collinearity, conﬁrm that the assessments in Tables 4 and 5 legitimately
judge the inﬂuence of these factors.17 In the context of this study,
16 Although some of the organisations in the category of the 501(c)(4) are closer to interest
advocacy groups, there are concerns about misleading results with this category, because it
contains various kinds of organisations that cannot be considered public interest groups, such as
the Rotary Club (Boris and Steuerle 2006, 70).
17 In the linear ﬁxed effect models, the highest VIF is 5.85 on the variable of the percentage of
population under 14 and the mean VIF is 3.04. In the non-linear ﬁxed effect models, the highest
VIF is 9.47 on the lagged variable of the number of women supervisors and the mean VIF is 3.87.
A VIF of more than ten is regarded as serious multicollinearity (Kutner et al. 2004, 409).
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Table 2. Summary statistics
Obs Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Total welfare expenditures (totalw) 627 2.56e + 08 6.70e +08 1,003,275 5.35e + 09
Number of women on county boards (wbos) 627 0.6379585 0.7313349 0 3
Percentage of women in state legislature
leadership positions (wsllp)
627 20.08 15.39409 0 42.9
Intergovernmental revenue (interg) 570 4.92e + 08 1.17e +09 4,925,563 9.31e + 09
Unemployment rate (unemp) 626 8.318051 3.679558 2.8 27.6
Per capita personal income (pci) 513 39,379.21 12,164.61 23,401 99,517
Median income (median) 627 65,181.5 16,644.16 37,350 129,235
Charter status 627 0.2280702 0.4199231 0 1
Proposition 1A 627 0.6363636 0.4814298 0 1
Number of non-proﬁts (ln) (lnnon) 621 3.651162 1.644362 0 7.985825
Percentage of Democratic votes (demv) 627 46.99314 12.59775 23.1 78.8
Percentage of female population (female) 627 49.27343 2.395282 35.16 52.1
Percentage of population over age 65 (over 65) 627 12.91329 3.500236 7.28 26.83
Percentage of population under age 14 (under) 627 20.50078 3.726759 12.98 28.74
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Table 3. Pairwise correlation among continuous variables
totalw wbos wsllp interg unemp pci median lnnon demv female over under
totalw 1.000
wbos 0.0412 1.0000
wsllp 0.0151 0.0085 1.0000
interg 0.9963* 0.0436 − 0.0074 1.0000
unemp − 0.0912 − 0.1643* 0.2540* − 0.1191 1.0000
pci 0.0939 0.1601* 0.0927 0.1189 − 0.4658* 1.0000
median 0.1256 0.1600* 0.0861 0.1507* − 0.4009* 0.8486* 1.0000
lnnon 0.5693* 0.1063 0.0542 0.5980* − 0.2635* 0.4073* 0.5055* 1.0000
demv 0.2642* 0.1618* 0.1769* 0.2648* − 0.0954* 0.6360* 0.6616* 0.5031* 1.0000
female 0.1353* 0.1375* − 0.0175 0.1455* − 0.1045 0.2275* 0.1749* 0.3401* 0.2362* 1.0000
Over 65 − 0.2481* 0.0507 0.0592 − 0.2598* − 0.0092 − 0.0035 −0.2077* −0.3634* − 0.2419* 0.1649* 1.0000
under 0.1906* − 0.0887 − 0.1425* 0.1970* 0.2189* − 0.2325* −0.1140* 0.2694* − 0.0437 0.2039* − 0.7181* 1.0000
Note: Coefﬁcients with asterisks are statistically signiﬁcant at Bonferroni-adjusted 0.05 levels.
286
P
A
R
K
Table 4. The linear ﬁxed effect models
Fixed Effect Model
(Linear)
Interaction Model
(Economic Variance)
Interaction Model
(Institutional Variance)
Total Expenditure on Welfare
Coefﬁcients
(SE)
Coefﬁcients
(SE)
Coefﬁcients
(SE)
Number of women on boards of supervisors in each county (L1) 2.73e + 05
(1.54e + 06)
1.93e +05
(1.52e +06)
− 2.68e + 05
(1.62e + 06)
Percentage of women in state legislature leadership positions (L1) 2.57e +05**
(1.19e + 05)
2.38e + 05*
(1.24e +05)
2.30e +05**
(1.08e + 05)
Intergovernmental revenue (federal + state) (L1) 0.205***
(0.007)
0.202***
(0.007)
0.204***
(0.007)
Unemployment rate in county level (L1) − 1.15e + 06
(1.15e + 06)
− 1.12e + 06
(1.04e +06)
− 1.13e + 06
(1.04e + 06)
Per capita personal income (L1) 49.952
(848.098)
108.057
(860.031)
258.840
(936.717)
Median income (L1) 705.976
(1,182.538)
747.539
(1,186.224)
789.660
(1,219.113)
Charter status †
Interaction (charter × number of women on county boards) 6.23e +06
(3.78e +06)
Interaction (unemployment rate × number of women on county boards) 4.07e + 05*
(2.32e + 05)
Proposition 1A (L1) − 1.99e + 07
(1.67e + 07)
− 2.02e + 07
(1.68e +07)
− 1.98e + 07
(1.67e + 07)
Number of non-proﬁt organisations in human services (L1, LN) 2.53e + 06
(3.25e + 06)
2.25e +06
(3.11e +06)
3.28e + 06
(3.37e + 06)
Percentage of Democratic votes in presidential elections (L1) 1.20e +06**
(4.88e + 05)
1.21e + 06**
(4.91e +05)
1.16e +06**
(4.75e + 05)
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Table 4. Continued
Fixed Effect Model
(Linear)
Interaction Model
(Economic Variance)
Interaction Model
(Institutional Variance)
Total Expenditure on Welfare
Coefﬁcients
(SE)
Coefﬁcients
(SE)
Coefﬁcients
(SE)
Percentage of females in total population (L1) 2.01e +05
(7.74e +06)
4.31e + 05
(7.59e + 06)
2.77e +05
(7.66e +06)
Percentage of population over 65 (L1) − 6.45e +05
(1.95e +06)
− 8.09e +05
(1.97e + 06)
− 1.44e +06
(2.24e +06)
Percentage of population under 14 (L1) − 1.52e +06
(3.02e +06)
− 1.75e +06
(3.03e + 06)
− 1.25e +06
(3.01e +06)
Constant 1.00e +08
(3.74e +08)
9.16e + 07
(3.65e + 08)
8.56e +07
(3.75e +08)
sigma_u 4.411e + 08 4.433e + 08 4.406e + 08
sigma_e 29,974,900 29,940,012 29,961,378
ρ (fraction of variance due to u_i) 0.99540273 0.99545855 0.99539654
Number of obs 507 507 507
Number of groups 57 57 57
R2
Within 0.2949 0.2982 0.2987
Between 0.9764 0.9734 0.9717
Overall 0.9728 0.9698 0.9682
F-value F(12,56)=260.52 F(13,56)=243.62 F(13,56)=219.07
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: †Charter variable is included in the model as a constitutional term of the interaction models but omitted because of collinearity. The
results are not affected by the inclusion.
L1, variables that lagged one year; LN, variables with natural logarithm.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p< 0.1, SE noted in parentheses are adjusted for 57 clusters in id (county).
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Table 5. The non-linear ﬁxed effect models
Fixed Effect Model
(Non-Linear)
Interaction Model
(Charter)
Interaction Model
(Economy)
Total Expenditure on Welfare
Coefﬁcients
(SE)
Coefﬁcients
(SE)
Coefﬁcients
(SE)
Number of women on boards of supervisors in each county (L1) −2.07e + 05
(1.54e + 06)
− 8.90e +04
(1.60e +06)
− 2.71e + 05
(1.57e + 06)
[Number of women on boards of supervisors in each county
(L1)]2
1.65e + 06*
(9.26e + 05)
1.06e + 06*
(9.30e +05)
2.39e + 05
(1.50e + 06)
Percentage of women in state legislature leadership positions
(L1)
2.41e +05**
(1.12e + 05)
2.33e + 05**
(1.18e +05)
2.29e + 05**
(1.04e + 05)
[Percentage of women in state legislature leadership positions
(L1)]2
355.988
(1328.270)
383.198
(1319.594)
345.096
(1314.985)
Intergovernmental revenue (federal + state) (L1) 0.204***
(0.007)
0.202***
(0.007)
0.203***
(0.007)
Unemployment rate in county level (L1) −1.07e + 06
(−1.07e +06)
− 1.07e +06
(−1.07e + 06)
− 1.11e + 06
(1.09e + 06)
Per capita personal income (L1) 182.182
(918.347)
163.437
(910.028)
231.711
(944.516)
Median income (L1) 799.391
(1230.884)
799.899
(1232.206)
802.924
(1231.697)
Charter status †
Interaction (charter × number of women on county boards) 4.36e +06
(4.11e +06)
Interaction (unemployment rate × number of women on county
boards)
3.63e + 05
(3.88e + 05)
Proposition 1A (L1) −2.05e + 07
(1.69e + 07)
− 2.05e +07
(1.70e +07)
− 1.99e + 07
(1.65e + 07)
Number of non-proﬁt organisations in human services (L1, LN) 3.91e + 06
(3.57e + 06)
3.22e +06
(3.23e +06)
3.39e + 06
(3.76e + 06)
Percentage of Democratic votes in presidential elections (L1) 1.23e +06**
(5.32e + 05)
1.24e + 06**
(5.32e +05)
1.18e + 06**
(5.12e + 05)
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Table 5. Continued
Fixed Effect Model
(Non-Linear)
Interaction Model
(Charter)
Interaction Model
(Economy)
Total Expenditure on Welfare
Coefﬁcients
(SE)
Coefﬁcients
(SE)
Coefﬁcients
(SE)
Percentage of females in total population (L1) − 2.20e +05
(7.26e +06)
1.46e + 05
(7.31e + 06)
3.19e + 05
(7.37e + 06)
Percentage of population over 65 (L1) − 9.84e +05
(2.09e +06)
−9.74e + 05
(2.05e + 06)
− 1.39e + 06
(2.17e + 06)
Percentage of population under 14 (L1) − 1.27e +06
(3.04e +06)
−1.44e + 06
(3.03e + 06)
− 1.10e + 06
(3.01e + 06)
Constant 1.01e +08
(3.48e +08)
9.02e + 07
(3.46e + 08)
7.84e + 07
(3.56e + 08)
sigma_u 4.404e + 08 4.422e + 08 4.406e +08
sigma_e 29,979,207 29,987,710 30,029,416
ρ (fraction of variance due to u_i) 0.9953870 0.99542225 0.99537651
Number of obs 507 507 507
Number of groups 57 57 57
R2
Within 0.2979 0.2991 0.2988
Between 0.9712 0.9710 0.9715
Overall 0.9678 0.9675 0.9680
F-value F(14,56)=230.70 F(15,56)= 224.78 F(15,56)=210.36
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: † Charter variable is included in the model as a constitutive term of the interaction models but omitted because of collinearity. The
results are not affected by the inclusion.
L1, variables that lagged one year; LN, variables with natural logarithm.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p< 0.1, SE noted in parentheses are adjusted for 57 clusters in id (county).
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however, the city and county of San Francisco has been excluded as an
outlier from the analysis, most importantly with regard to its unique status
as the only consolidated city-county in California. The number of members
on the San Francisco Board of Supervisors is 11, while all other counties
have ﬁve members on their boards. Given the available data, the exclusion
of San Francisco does not affect the results associated with gender repre-
sentation in the present study.
Panel data can be estimated using several different models according to
the assumption of the characteristics of residuals. Based on theoretical
reasons and statistical tests, such as the F-test and Hausman test
(Hsiao 2007), the ﬁxed effect model turned out to be an appropriate
method to estimate the relative impacts of the independent variables in the
equation. A choice of either ﬁxed or random effects estimation can be jus-
tiﬁed in the theoretical and technical dimensions. However, econome-
tricians now argue that the Hausman test does not help in deciding between
ﬁxed and random effects. Instead, more weight is given to the size of
the data set, the extent of variability within units and the level of correlation
between and within the covariates and units (Clark and Linzer 2012).
The modelling of random effects usually follows strong assumptions,
such as a normal distribution and independence of residuals of explanatory
variables (without omitted variables), while ﬁxed effects estimators
do not rely on as strong assumptions as the random effects model and
therefore are not likely to fail. In addition, ﬁxed effects estimation is desired
for the purpose of investigating “the effects that are in the sample”,
while the alternative is prescribed for that of identifying “the population
characteristics” based on a supposedly random sample (Hsiao
2007). Therefore, the ﬁxed effects approach is preferable for this work,
based not only on the Hausman test, but also on the theoretical
considerations.
The levels of signiﬁcance used in this paper are 10 per cent, 5 per cent and
1 per cent. Although the conventional signiﬁcance level is 5 per cent, the
limit for statistical signiﬁcance was set at 10 per cent (p = 0.10) in this
paper. Although reducing the alpha level is one way to protect against
Type I error, it also increases the chance of a Type II error. The total number
of observations is 507, as we lost ten by excluding one panel and the city
and county of San Francisco and another 58 when creating interaction or
lagged variables. The remaining ﬁve missing values are missing from the
original data set. Robust SE were clustered by county. The relative impact of
the independent variables between the models with and without an interaction
term creates little change in sign, strength or statistical signiﬁcance.
The ﬁxed effects models with and without interaction terms assuming
linear and non-linear relationships are tested in this study. From the models
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accounting for a linear relationship, there are some noteworthy aspects to
the ﬁndings in Tables 4 and 5. First, gender representation in state legis-
lature leadership positions had a statistically signiﬁcant positive effect on
the amount of total welfare spending in California counties. This result
seems particularly noteworthy in light of the fact that there is a positive
relationship between women and welfare politics. The variable turns out to
be consistently signiﬁcant across all the models in the study. However, the
variable of the number of women on boards of supervisors in each county
was not signiﬁcant in the linear ﬁxed effect models.
Also noteworthy is the fact that the interaction term for the number of
women supervisors and county unemployment rate reached the signiﬁcance
level with a positive sign at the 90 per cent conﬁdence interval (with t-value
of 1.76). Although the inclusion of interaction terms requires that the
coefﬁcients be interpreted carefully, this suggests that women supervisors
are willing to spend more on welfare when a county faces ﬁnancial stress.
Since the unemployment rate itself was not signiﬁcant, this also indicates
that macro-economic variables moderated by the county leadership role
affect county welfare expenditures.
We can gain a better understanding by being sensitive to the changes
in the marginal effect of the variable. Figure 2 presents the changes
in the marginal effect of the number of women on county boards on total
welfare expenditures. The solid line indicates the marginal effect
of the number of women on county boards on unemployment rates,
while the dashed line shows the 90 per cent conﬁdence interval around
the solid line. Any particular point on the solid line is ∂Total welfare∂Women supervisors ¼
β1 + β3 Unemployment rate (Bramber et al. 2006, 75). When the
county unemployment rate is over 1.4 per cent, the percentage of
women supervisors on county boards are likely to be positively associatedwith
welfare spending.
The dashed lines marking the upper and lower bounds of the 90 per cent
conﬁdence interval around the estimate are both above the zero line at 10.3
per cent. This implies that the marginal effect of the number of women
supervisors becomes positively signiﬁcant when the county unemployment
rate exceeds 10.3 per cent. Therefore, when the economy sufﬁciently wor-
sens, the number of county board positions held by women has a statisti-
cally signiﬁcant positive effect on welfare spending, and the positive effect
increases as the number increases. Other than the importance of the county
leadership role in expanding welfare services, this ﬁnding suggests that
gender representation on county boards matters in times of economic
hardship. Contrary to the ﬁndings from other studies, which show that
institutional factors including charter status have an impact on changes in
county expenditures (Choi et al. 2010; Farmer 2011), however, both the
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interaction term and the dummy variable for charter status were not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant.18
Second, another variable revealed to have a statistically signiﬁcant
inﬂuence on total welfare spending is the political preference of county
residents. The importance of political factors in the politics of redistribution
cannot be overstated in the study of expenditures and policy outcomes
(Fry and Winters 1970, 508; Fosset and Thompson 2005). The effect of a
political variable was not overshadowed by socio-economic variables, a
ﬁnding that is contrary to some previous studies (see, e.g. Sharkansky and
Hofferbert 1969, 510). Interestingly, the residents’ political/ideological
attitude measured by the percentage of Democratic votes in presidential
elections had a strong positive effect on welfare spending in each county.
This relationship clearly reveals how county residents’ political preferences
affect choices on county welfare and conﬁrms much of what we expected,
namely that the Democratic Party stimulates welfare spending.
Yet, the variable representing the strength of interest groups was not
signiﬁcantly related to local welfare expenditures once the other variables
were controlled, although the sign and the correlation coefﬁcient were
consistent with expectations derived from our theory. Some possible
explanations include the fact that it is quite demanding to measure interest
group strength and its impact on spending choices. Although they
0
5000000
1.00e+07
1.50e+07
2.00e+07
M
ar
gi
na
l e
ffe
ct
 o
f
W
om
en
 o
n 
co
un
ty
 b
oa
rd
s
0 10 20 30
unemployment rate
1.4 10.3
Figure 2 The marginal effect of gender representation in county level on total
welfare spending.
Note: The dashed line shows the 90 per cent conﬁdence interval around the solid line.
18 The effect of the dummy variable for county home rule was estimated by employing the
ﬁxed effect model using group means.
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are assumed to be interest groups, non-proﬁt organisations classiﬁed as 501
(c)(3)s might not function as expected. Organisations in this category are
permitted to lobby to an extent, but they are more committed to charitable
contributions than political purposes (Boris and Steuerle 2006, 70). Another
explanationmay have to dowith government-non-proﬁt relations.Most of the
social welfare programmes after the Reagan administration were delivered
directly to consumers and not through non-proﬁts or producers of services
(Grønbjerg and Salamon 2003, 454).
Third, consistent with prior studies, county expenditures in redistributive
policy areas were determined primarily by intergovernmental revenue from
the federal and state governments (Park 1996; Bahl et al. 2002; Farmer
2011). Although our study could not ascertain the differential effect of state
and federal ﬁnancial support, estimates suggest that a one-dollar increase in
intergovernmental revenue leads to an increase of about 20 cents in county
spending on public assistance.19 Accordingly, the decision to shrink welfare
in state government will have a direct impact on county governments.20
Because state governments tend to spend less on welfare programmes and
more on economic development during economic recessions (Witco and
Newmark 2009, 219), local governments have to solve the dilemma of
providing more services with less money. In sum, the state redistributive
decisions are critical in determining the level of welfare spending in coun-
ties, regardless of the local discretion in choosing the subcategories of
services.
Finally, after controlling for economic and political variables, demo-
graphic characteristics had no discernible impact on redistributive choices.
Based on this ﬁnding, the percentage of females in the population, popu-
lation over 65, population under 14, median income and per capita per-
sonal income do not appear to be associated with signiﬁcantly higher
welfare expenditures. This seems contrary to the ﬁndings of previous
research (Park 1996; Farmer 2011), but is consistent with Peterson’s (1981)
argument that social service expenditures are not related to indicators of
19 Although it is beyond the scope of this article, the extent to which state and federal aid
impacts local expenditures is not the same. Federal aid has a more indirect effect on local redis-
tributive services, because local ofﬁcials regard them as outside or pass-through money and use
the money as if it were its own source revenue (Stein 1990; Benton 1992; Farmer 2011). Owing to
the dependence of counties on state aid and the strict legal obligations in the redistributive area,
state aid has a more direct stimulative effect on county welfare spending (Stein 1990; Benton
1992; Park 1996; Farmer 2011).
20 Economic hardship may affect the state’s incentive to cut welfare, but the relationship
would be beyond the scope of the present discussion. The result does not support direct causal
relations between them, and the correlation coefﬁcient between the unemployment rate and
intergovernmental revenue was not signiﬁcant (−0.1191).
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local demands in the community. This could, in part, be due to the fact that
the political/ideology variable reﬂects much of the socio-economic status of
county residents. Other plausible explanations might include the over-
whelming inﬂuence of the state government in the politics of redistribution.
To explore the potential quadratic effects of gender representation, the
same series of regressions, including the squared term of both the number of
female county supervisors and the percentage of women in the state legis-
lature, are presented in Table 5. In the non-linear ﬁxed effect models, the
estimates of the squared term of the number of women county supervisors
turned out to be statistically signiﬁcant. Although the ﬁndings are not
particularly robust or strong, it suggests a potentially positive non-linear
effect of gender representation in the county level on welfare spending. The
inclusion of the squared variables did not change the result of the regression
substantially. The additional control variables follow the same pattern.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the politics of redistribution in local government.
With hard data from 58 counties over a period of ten years, this study
attempts to present explanations of the redistributive choices of California
counties under chronic ﬁnancial stress. Among the various leadership
qualities, this study includes gender in county and state leadership positions
as an important determinant of local welfare spending.
The ﬁndings from the panel data analysis leads us to conclude that the
social welfare services in California counties are primarily determined by
the state’s leadership, ﬁnancial support from other governments and the
political/ideological preferences of county residents. Welfare spending by
county governments is likely to be inﬂuenced by various combinations of
these factors. Although other demographic variables were not signiﬁcant,
the results presented here provide supporting evidence of the effect county
residents have on redistributive choices. Counties with more supporters of
Democratic presidential candidates are likely to spend more on welfare
services.
The empirical evidence on the effect of gender representation in the
leadership positions in state and county government follows the general
pattern predicted by the model. Gender representation in the local gov-
ernment and state legislature had a different effect on policy choices related
to welfare. The increase in the percentage of women in state legislature
leadership positions had a statistically signiﬁcant positive effect on local
welfare spending, while the increase in the number of women on county
boards had no signiﬁcant effect. Interestingly, however, the effect of gender
representation at the county level may have a quadratic relationship with
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welfare spending in the non-linear models. In addition, the effect of gender
in county leadership seems contingent upon the economic situation.
An increase in the number of women on county boards has a slight but
signiﬁcantly positive association with an increase in local welfare
expenditures when the county economy goes bad. Put differently, the effect
of economic hardship on social welfare varies across California counties,
and this difference can be partly explained by gender representation on
county boards.
We expect this work to give us insight into the critical problem of
ﬁnancial resource allocation by local governments. We have attempted to
understand the impact of gender on local welfare spending and conclude
that gender is a crucial variable in the study of welfare politics, especially
when interacting with the economic environment. The ﬁndings of the study
support the relationship between women and the politics of redistribution
at the local level and provide evidence for the literature on representative
bureaucracy, especially as related to the link between passive and sub-
stantive representation. This study also offers implications for leadership at
the county level. Given the substantial level of discretion county authorities
have, exploring and examining how leadership affects policy choices at the
county level is essential to understanding the dynamics of state-local relation-
ships. This study contributes to existing explanations of local government
variations on providing and delivering social welfare services. The potential
impact of gender representation on other policy areas vulnerable to economic
and ﬁscal crises deserves more attention. Considering the need for longitudinal
research on this issue, this research has the potential to contribute to the
scholarship on diversity and representation in the public sector, aswell as bring
to attention implications for American local governments.
Despite its contribution, caution should be taken in generalising the
ﬁndings from this study. The politics of redistribution may be different in
other contexts, such as for cities with secondary responsibilities for welfare
under competitive pressure and for counties in other states with their own
historical backgrounds. There might be other important factors that inﬂu-
ence the scope of local service provision, such as political culture (Benton
2002a, 197) and electoral competition (Barrilleaux et al. 2002). An
important caveat of the analysis is that it does not directly tackle endo-
geneity issues among the variables. Gender representation in leadership
positions cannot be achieved in a short period of time, while the ways in
which gender representation affect welfare spending can be complex and
have a long-term impact. Although we attempt to ensure temporal precedence
by lagging independent variables, the empirical models of this study could not
rule out the possibility that the gender representation may itself be a result of
other processes. Future research should assess this relationship.
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